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Abstract  
 
GDP per worker fell for the five years after 2008 which is unprecedented in post war UK 
history. In this paper we argue that “capital shallowing” (i.e. the fall in the capital-labour 
ratio) could be the main reason for this. This is likely to have occurred due to changes in 
factor prices: a large fall in real wages and increases in the cost of capital. In previous 
recessions real wages did not fall, but reforms to union strength and welfare have made 
wages more sensitive to negative demand shocks. This wage flexibility is desirable as it 
reduces the risks of long-term unemployment building up. After accounting for changes in 
capital TFP is more similar to earlier recessions and likely to be related to under-utilised 
resources and misallocation. The fall in labour productivity is therefore likely to reverse if 
demand improves – e.g. through stronger monetary or fiscal policy stimulus.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the long-run productivity growth is the main determinant of material wellbeing. 
Contrary to popular belief there is a reasonably tight relationship between the growth of 
real hourly compensation and the growth of GDP per hour over the last 40 years (see 
Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2012). Figure 1 shows that the “decoupling” between average 
compensation and productivity has been exaggerated.
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 Given the importance of
productivity, it is a serious concern that labour productivity has fallen since the onset of 
the Great Recession in 2008. GDP per worker was about 10% lower at the start of 2013 
than it would have been had productivity continued to grow on a trend of 2% per annum 
(1971-2007 average) after 2008Q2 (see Figure 2).  
There are many possible culprits behind the fall in labour productivity. One popular view 
is that of the “supply side pessimists” (King, 2013) who argue that the fall of productivity 
is permanent and structural, perhaps linked to the financial crisis or to some kind of 
mismeasurement of productivity in the decades leading up to the crisis. In this view the 
level of current output is close to potential output and attempts to stimulate the economy 
with monetary policy through quantitative easing (QE) will just stoke up inflation. 
Similarly, pessimists argue not only against relaxing the current fiscal consolidation 
programme (e.g. as suggested by Bagaria et al, 2012, through higher public investment), 
but even for a further tightening of fiscal austerity to avoid debt traps. 
In this paper we emphasis one explanation that can potentially account for both the twin 
puzzles of low productivity and of surprisingly low unemployment given poor GDP 
growth. This explanation emphasises wage flexibility. Real wages are much more 
responsive to negative output shocks in the last few years than they have been in previous 
recessions (see Gregg et al, 2013). This is a secular change over time that is likely to be 
1
 The confusion arises because of a focus in the decoupling literature on the growth of median wages 
(deflated by the CPI) rather than average compensation (deflated by the GDP deflator). Standard theory 
points to a long-run relationship between productivity and average compensation with a common deflator 
in the absence a growth in the profit share of GDP. For example, median wages can diverge from average 
compensation due to a rise in wage inequality as has happened in the UK. See Pessoa and Van Reenen 
(2012) for more details. 
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due to weaker union power and welfare reforms that keep effective labour supply high 
even when demand is low (e.g. Blundell et al, 2004; Van Reenen, 2004). This flexibility 
meant that unlike earlier recessions, real wages fell significantly and employers faced 
lower labour costs than in earlier downturns. As real wages fall there is a fall in the 
capital-labour ratio (“capital shallowing”) as people are substituted for structures and 
equipment. A second force that increased capital shallowing is the fact that this recession 
is a financial crisis that has increased the effective cost of capital, especially for small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Banks have been reluctant to lend as they repair their 
balance sheets. Because capital-labour ratios fell in response to changing factor prices, 
labour productivity has also fallen, but not necessarily Total Factor Productivity (TFP). 
Since it is TFP that determines long-run economic growth, our view is that this more 
important measure of productivity has been more resilient than usually imagined. 
Although there are many difficulties in accurately measuring the capital stock, our 
estimates suggest that most of the fall of labour productivity can be mainly accounted for 
by the fall in effective capital per worker (with some contribution from the fall in hour 
per worker). TFP trends over the recession look much more like those in the 1970s and 
1980s and are not so surprising given the magnitude of the global shock. 
Another way of seeing the point of this paper is that it is absurd to think that the correct 
counterfactual for the last five years is simply the extrapolation of the trend line in Figure 
2. First, given that the output shock was huge, financially based and has been
accompanied by multiple policy mistakes, a better counterfactual is to look at previous 
recessions. Second, when considering the collateral damage to the economy we should 
consider TFP which removes the impact of changes in other inputs such as capital and 
hours rather than GDP per worker. When these adjustments are done, the current 
recessions looks more like previous deep postwar recessions than an event that should 
cause a change in potential growth. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the basic facts, Section III 
sketches our main theory, Section IV discusses other explanations of the productivity 
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mystery, Section V offers some preliminary quantitative estimates and Section VI 
concludes. 
II.      SOME BASIC FACTS 
In an accounting sense the productivity puzzle is easily explained. GDP is still about 3% 
below the level it stood at the start of the crisis in 2008 whereas employment levels have 
largely recovered. Consequently, as a matter of arithmetic, GDP per worker fell. Figure 3 
shows the cumulative change of GDP since the start of the downturn (black line) 
compared to its evolution in all other major recessions in the last century. The current 
recovery is worse than all of them as by this point of the business cycle; GDP had made a 
stronger recovery in the Inter-War years. 
Figure 4 produces the analogous figure for labour productivity for post-war recessions. It 
is clear that productivity stalls or drops in all recessions. The fall was likely to be larger 
in this recession because the magnitude of the 2008/09 shock was larger. Indeed, two 
years after the start of the current recession, labour productivity was at a similar level to 
the mid 1970s recession. What is more surprising is that over four years later productivity 
had still not recovered and appears worse than all other postwar downturns. 
The fall of GDP per hour looks worse than the fall of total GDP because the labour 
market has recovered more quickly than the output market. The fall in GDP per worker is 
worse than the fall in GDP per hour as there has been a move to more part-time work, 
self-employment and zero hours contracts which has caused hours per worker to fall. This 
is explored more deeply by Blundell et al (2013) and Wadsworth (2013) and we will 
examine the quantitative importance of hours in Section V. The key fact though is that 
labour productivity has fallen on both a per worker and a per hour basis. 
There are two pieces of evidence that suggest that the fall in productivity may be 
temporary rather than permanent. Firstly, the UK is not unique in having a “productivity 
puzzle” as other European countries also experienced a fall in labour productivity (see 
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Figure 5). US productivity did do much better than in Europe, but again this is the 
flipside of what happened in the jobs market. Although the magnitude of the initial GDP 
shock was similar in the US and the European countries, American unemployment rose 
much more severely (from 4.4% in late 2006 to 10% in late 2009) compared to the UK 
and Germany. Part of the reason for the faster rise in US unemployment in than in the UK 
may be because of lower US firing costs, the extensions of unemployment benefit and 
deeper problems in the housing market. 
A second cause for possible optimism is that the fall in UK productivity is surprising in 
the light of recent economic history. As shown in Aghion et al (2013), the UK reversed a 
century of economic decline in the three decades after the end of the 1970s. Figure 6 
shows that the advantage in per capita GDP enjoyed by the UK in 1870 over our 
American and European counterparts had evaporated by 1979 with the US, France and 
Germany all ahead of the UK. In the next three decades however, something changed. On 
the eve of the crisis, the UK had again overtaken France and Germany and made inroads 
into the lead of the US.  
Some of this was due to improvements in the labour market with employment rates 
rising. But a good part was due to an improvement in productivity growth. Figure 7 
shows that UK productivity growth outstripped the other countries after 1979 under both 
Conservative and Labour governments. With the exception of the US this is true even 
taking the Great Recession into account. Nor was this strong productivity growth simply 
due to unsustainable booms in finance, oil, property or the government sector. Corry et al 
(2012) show that value added per hour growth in the market sector (dropping the public 
and property sectors) was about 2.7% per annum 1979-2007 and only around a tenth of 
this productivity growth was accounted for by the financial services sector.
2
Aghion et al (2013) argue that these productivity improvements can be linked to policy 
reforms such as enhanced product market competition (e.g. privatisation and tougher 
2
 Oulton (2013) shows that given the way GDP is measured in the UK finance cannot have caused a large 
bias in the measurement of GDP growth in the pre-crisis period. This is essentially because finance is an 
intermediate input so is no counted in GDP which is value-added.  
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anti-trust policies), labour market flexibility (e.g. weakening union power) and the 
growth of independent institutions such as utility regulators, the Monetary Policy 
Committee and the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). If these 
improvements to UK economic capacity were real, it seems unlikely that they would 
quickly disappear. 
Having said this, it is of course possible that a large part of the productivity loss is 
permanent and/or that the UK is on a much lower trend growth path for the foreseeable 
future even though this would be a break with historical experience. To explore this we 
turn to a simple model and empirical evidence in the next two sections 
III.    THEORY
Flexibility of the labour market 
Consider a representative firm facing competitive market conditions with a constant 
returns production function of the form:  
1Q AL K                                                                 (PF) 
where Q is output, L is labour, K is capital and A is TFP. From the first order conditions, 
labour productivity is related to the real product wage, i.e. nominal wages (W) deflated by 
the output price deflator (P)  
1Q W
L P
 (MRPL) 
This gives us a conventional downward sloping labour demand curve as illustrated in 
Figure 8. For simplicity we consider an inelastic supply curve which generates an 
equilibrium wage with full employment L = L* where L* is the labour force.  
Now consider a recession which is a negative output shock (Q to Q’) shifting the labour 
demand curve to the left. In a “normal” recession real wages are downwardly rigid, hence 
employment will fall and unemployment will emerge (L*- L’). Notice that equation 
(MRPL) still holds as even though output and employment are lower their ratio remains 
7 
the same (Q’/L’). Because real wages are unchanged labour productivity is also 
unchanged.  
The polar opposite case of a classical labour market where real wages are completely 
flexible in Figure 9. In this case real wages fall to ensure full employment, but now 
labour productivity has fallen 
' 1 'Q W Q
L P L
  . The greater flexibility of real wages has 
protected jobs, but measured productivity is lower. 
One way the adjustment takes place is through changes in the capital-labour ratio. 
Combining the first order conditions for labour and capital we obtain 
1K W
L R




where R is the cost of capital. Assuming that the cost of capital is unchanged, the fall in 
W means an offsetting fall in K. This fall in the capital-labour ratio will depress labour 
productivity, the output to labour ratio. 
Another way to see this is to re-write the production function in logarithmic changes and 
solve for TFP growth:  
ln ln( / ) (1 ) ln( / )A Q L K L                                                   (TFP) 
TFP growth is the difference between labour productivity growth and the change in the 
(weighted) capital-labour ratio. A pure demand shock causes a fall in ln( / )Q L  and 
ln( / )K L  but leaves TFP unchanged.  
This is obviously an extreme model as real wages are not really fully flexible and will not 
fall by as much as suggested in Figure 9. Nevertheless, if the current recession is closer to 
Figure 9 and previous recessions were closer to Figure 8, then this may explain why 
employment has fallen by less in this recession than in previous recessions and labour 
productivity has fallen by more.  
The qualitative evidence gives considerable support for this simple model. We focus on 
the four full years after 2008Q2 as the Lehman’s collapse was in 2008Q3 and there are 
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likely to be much more severe data revisions in the most recent quarters. In the four years 
after 2008Q2 real product wages fell by 4% (and CPI deflated wages by 8%). This is 
unprecedented for a post-war recession and is likely linked to policy reforms that have 
weakened unions, lowered the replacement rate and kept up work search pressure on 
benefit claimants (those claiming Job Seekers Allowance, but also Incapacity and Lone 
Parent Benefits). The sensitivity of wages to negative shocks has increased over time: 
Gregg et al (2013) show that the “wage curve” (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) has 
become more elastic, i.e. an increase in unemployment has a more depressing effect on 
real wages today than in the 1980s or 1990s. 
Other causes of a fall in the effective capital to labour ratio 
In addition to falls in real wages, other factors may have depressed the capital-labour 
ratio. According to Bank of England (2012) the cost of capital for large firms has risen by 
about a quarter from 8% in the pre-crisis period to 10% in 2012 (see Figure 10). The 
increase in the cost of capital for SMEs is likely to be far higher. Despite a fall in the 
Bank of England’s base rate banks have been re-building their balance sheets and are so 
very reluctant to lend. Various government credit easing schemes such as Project Merlin, 
the National Loan Guarantee Scheme and Funding for Lending do not seem to have made 
a significant impact (e.g. Armstrong, 2013).  
Investment has been held back by low demand expectations and a higher cost of capital. 
But a third factor is that uncertainty has also risen. This always tends to increase in 
recessions (see Bloom et al, 2013) but the increase in uncertainty in this recession may 
have been particularly severe due to the size of the demand shock. Although fiscal policy 
was aggressive in the first year of the recession, in subsequent years policy-makers have 
struggled to find a consistent way to tackle the problem of low growth and spiraling 
deficits. In 2010 the new UK coalition government accelerated an already tough austerity 
programme inherited from the previous Labour administration, and has had to constantly 
revise its estimates of growth downwards and budget deficits upwards. The crisis in the 
Eurozone has a strong affect on the UK as almost half of all exports go there. The chaos 
over the fiscal cliff, debt ceiling and sequester in the US has also added to policy 
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uncertainty. Since uncertainty can be an important barrier to investment (Bloom, Bond 
and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 2009), this policy risk may further reduce investment.
3
Together these factors may explain the collapse of investment in the UK as shown in 
Figure 11. The UK has had a problem of low investment for many decades (Aghion et al, 
2013) and this has taken a severe turn for the worse since 2008. In Section V we show 
how this helps resolve much of the productivity puzzle as it leads to a fall in capital 
intensity and therefore output.  
IV. OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN 
Mismeasurement 
One mundane explanation for the puzzle is simply mismeasurement. The denominator of 
labour productivity is simply employment or hours and measurement error is not likely to 
be a major concern here (although there could be some contribution coming from the 
increasing number of self-employed and those on zero-hours contracts). A more serious 
concern is that GDP may be understated. The GDP number is subject to very large 
revisions, but Grice (2012) shows that the magnitude of these revisions is not usually 
large enough to explain away the puzzle and future revisions may lower the GDP number 
rather than raise them.
4
Under-utilisation of resources 
As Wadsworth (2013) points out, the UK population has risen by about a million since 
2008, so the absolute number of jobs is a poor measure of labour market tightness. As 
expected - there has been a significant rise in unemployment and fall in the employment 
rate (employees as a proportion of working age population) during the recession. So there 
is clear under-utilisation of human resources. Labour productivity measures account for 
this, however, as only employed or hours are in the denominator. It may well be, 
3
 Of course, uncertainty will also reduce hiring, but since labour has lower adjustment costs than capital the 
impact is likely to be less severe. 
4
 Still the disruption of the ONS move to Newport and severe nature of the recession leaves room for 
concern. For example, if service exports were severely understated this would help resolve both the puzzle 
of both why productivity and exports are so surprisingly low despite a large sterling depreciation. 
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however, that people are not being used to their full potential when in work. This is 
usually described as “labour hoarding” whereby firms will not reduce employment by as 
much as expected as they hope that demand will pick up later and do not want to pay the 
cost of re-hiring the laid off workers (e.g. if they have firm-specific human capital). This 
is the usual explanation of why productivity is pro-cyclical.  
 
The labour hoarding story has become less plausible as time goes by. This is because 
employment rates have been rising for the last two years and it is hard to square this with 
labour hoarding. There is some evidence that the increase in employment has been in 
some low productivity sectors, however, so the hoarding may still be happening in some  
firms and sectors where demand remains depressed but employers are reluctant to shed as 
many workers even though output has fallen (e.g. Martin and Rowthorn, 2012).  
 
Zombies: Misallocation of capital 
Representative firm models are a poor reflection of economic reality as firms differ 
considerably in their productivity, efficiency and management quality (Appendix Figure 
1 shows the extreme heterogeneity of management quality across firms in all countries). 
Modern theories of heterogeneous firms emphasis that much of aggregate productivity 
growth is caused by the reallocation of capital from less productive to more productive 
firms. A given aggregate quantity of capital may be allocated in different ways across 
firms of heterogeneous efficiency. Allocating too much capital to inefficient firms for 
example will diminish aggregate productivity. This has been shown to be of first order 
importance when considering aggregate productivity differences across countries (e.g. 
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta, 2013; Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bloom, Sadun 
and Van Reenen, 2013). Some have argued that this could account for the fall in UK 
productivity (Bank of England, 2012). Another way of saying this is that the effective 
amount of aggregate capital has fallen due to increased misallocation. 
 
There is some suggestive evidence of these capital misallocation forces having got worse 
in the recession. First, the rate of bankruptcies and liquidations appears to be particularly 
low given the macro-economic climate (See Figure 12). Second, the cross sectional 
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variance of employment, output and prices has increased across sectors (see Figure 13). 
Finally, Field and Franklin (2013) point to the increased variance of productivity across 
establishments even within sectors.  
 
Why should misallocation have become worse? First, Bloom et al (2013) argue that 
increased uncertainty is pervasive in all recessions and that this is responsible for a 
substantial fraction of aggregate productivity falls. As noted above, uncertainty may be 
particularly severe in the current recession.  
 
A second set of reasons focuses more directly on the dysfunctionality of the financial 
system – after all, a massive banking crisis was the catalyst for the 2008/9 Great 
Recession. The major issue here is of bank “forbearance”, i.e. that banks are reluctant to 
call in underperforming loans to firms and projects that can no longer make their interest 
payments. Hence low productivity projects and firms that in “normal times” should have 
exited the economy do not, and their persistence pulls down aggregate productivity. Why 
should banks behave in such a manner? It may be rational to allow debt 
restructuring/forgiveness if lenders believe that projects are ultimately viable and demand 
will recover (analogous to labour hoarding). However, lenders may be sure that a project 
will not be viable and still not call in their loans if they are reluctant to admit the true 
state of the under-performing loans on their balance sheet as this may force them into 
bankruptcy or regulatory intervention. This seems to have been a pervasive feature of 
Japan following the bust of the asset bubble in the 1980s (e.g. Caballero et al, 2008). A 
second reason for forbearance may be political pressure, especially when many banks are 
fully or partially owned by the public sector (e.g. RBS) as politicians are reluctant to push 
SMEs into bankruptcy and be seen to be making workers redundant. 
 
These under-performing companies are often pejoratively called “zombies”. If output 
could be swiftly reallocated from low productivity zombies to other projects this would 
tend to raise productivity. However, if some of the value of the assets were lost this is a 
cost to be born in mind. For example, there may be firm-specific capital that is lost or 
workers may spend considerable time in non-employment before they are reallocated to 
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more productive firms. Since these problems may be particularly severe in deep 
recessions, it is not obvious that faster closing down of the zombies is welfare enhancing. 
Although it is often assumed in Austrian economics that recessions are the best time for 
cleansing the economy of low productivity firms, the evidence on this is unclear. For 
example, in a financially driven recession many productive firms may also be closed 
down during a sharp downturn if they are credit constrained (e.g. smaller actual and 
potential innovators as in Garicano and Steinwender, 2013). 
The direct micro-evidence on zombies is rather mixed. In the early part of the recession 
in 2008-2009 it seemed as if most of the fall in productivity was confined to small firms 
who may be most susceptible to forbearance. However, after 2009 it appears that 
productivity also fell in larger firms. Furthermore, decompositions of the aggregate fall in 
labour productivity suggest it is a within establishment rather than a between 
establishment phenomenon (Bank of England, 2013). However, the fall in labour 
productivity in these surviving firms is all accounted for by falls in real wages and 
investment (Crawford et al, 2013) 
Since the forbearance story is mainly on the exit/entry dimension, this suggests that the 
problem is with ongoing plants rather than zombies. Consequently, the role of zombies 
seems less important than changes in factor prices. 
Intangible capital 
Our focus so far has been on tangible capital, but an influential line of research suggests 
that intangible capital such as scientific know-how, business practices, advertising, etc. 
may be as important as more conventional equipment and structures. Goodridge, Haskel 
and Wallis (2013) allow for intangible capital in analysing UK productivity growth 
through 2010 and argue that about a third of the productivity slowdown could be due to 
mismeasurement of intangible capital. The essential problem is that output growth is 
mismeasured when intangible capital is ignored. Intangible investment should be part of 
GDP but is instead treated only as an intermediate input and therefore not included in 
GDP (which is a value added based measure net of intermediate inputs). During times 
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when intangible investment is growing fast (as in the late 1990s and early 2000s) GDP 
growth and therefore productivity is over-estimated. During periods when intangible 
investment is growing more slowly (as today) GDP and productivity growth is under-
estimated. 
Labour quality 
Another explanation of the fall in labour productivity is that the quality of the workforce 
could have deteriorated: for example, older workers may be delaying retirement because 
of the fall in house prices. In fact, labour quality tends to rise during recessions as 
unskilled and less experienced workers are more likely to be unemployed. The current 
recession is similar in this regard. But the relevant counterfactual is what happened in 
previous recessions. It does not appear that there is much of a difference in the increase in 
labour quality in this recession compared to previous recessions, however (Blundell et al, 
2013). This may seem surprising given the more flexible labour market, but it appears 
that the main reason for the fall in aggregate real wages is that incumbent workers are 
accepting more nominal wage freezes which are eroding aggregate real wages.  
V.      PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
Table 1 gives some examples of some growth accounting estimates over recent years 
where we are just using equation (TFP) to decompose the growth of whole economy 
GDP per worker: ln( / ) ln (1 ) ln( / )Q L A K L      . These are very crude, “back of 
the envelope” estimates in order to examine whether the labour market flexibility story 
might matter  quantitatively. We focus on the four years of 2008Q2 to 2012Q2 from the 
start of the recession to where data is less likely to be subject to large revisions. Over this 
period whole economy real GDP fell by 3.6% (column (1)), employment by 1.1% and 
GDP per worker by 2.5% (column (2)). Estimating the change in the capital stock is non-
trivial as the ONS have not produced a measure of the UK capital stock since 2009. A 
series for the volume of real investment is produced, however, so we update the net 
capital stock in 2008 with this quarterly investment series using the perpetual inventory 
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method.
5
 We estimate that capital per worker has declined by 5% using this method 
(column (4)). Assuming that GDP is split two-thirds to labour costs and one third to 
capital costs implies that “capital shallowing” has made a contribution of -1.8 percentage 
points to declining labour productivity (column (4)). Hence, changes in capital can 
account for about 68% of the labour productivity decline.  This is obviously a much 
smaller proportion of the gap between current labour productivity and what it might have 
been “but for” the recession (recall Figure 2), but we have argued that this is an 
unrealistic  counterfactual. A more plausible counterfactual would be the productivity 
experience of previous severe recessions, which we examine below. 
 
Our estimates of the fall in the aggregate capital stock are larger than others have used on 
shorter runs of data (e.g. ONS, 2013; Goodridge et al, 2013) so we performed some 
checks on the plausibility of the estimates.  The model presented earlier implies that the 
evolution of relative factor uses could be described as ln( / ) ln( / )K L W R   . The real 
product wage fell by 4.1% in the four years after 2008Q2 and the Bank of England 
(2012) suggests an increase in the cost of capital of 2%. This implies a fall in the capital-
labour ratio of 6.1% and therefore an even bigger contribution of capital to the fall in 
labour productivity - it now accounts for 83% of the fall in row 2 of Table 1. Our data 
runs through the end of 2012 so we examined re-estimating the model adding the final 
quarters of the year (i.e. the period from 2008Q2 to 2012Q4). As labour productivity 
improved a bit in the last two quarters we more than account for the entire fall of labour 
productivity. In the final row we use a lower depreciation rate of capital and find similar 
results to the baseline of row 1. 
  
Taking Table 1 as a whole capital shallowing caused by changes in factor prices seems to 
account for at least two-thirds of the fall in labour productivity in the period since the 
start of the Great Recession. 
 
                                                 
5
 We use a quarterly depreciation rate of 2.2%, slightly higher than normal to reflect capital scrapping in the 
baseline results, but check the sensitivity of this assumption to alternative depreciation rates. 
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Figure 14 illustrates another way of pulling the information together. It again decomposes 
the fall in GDP per worker into a contribution from capital and TFP, but now also 
includes an estimate of the role of declining hours per worker.
6
 In other words we look at 
including a correction for the change in average hours worked ( ln( / )H L ) in our labour 
productivity decomposition: 
ln( / ) ln (1 ) ln( / ) ln( / )Q L A K L H L          
As in row 1 of Table 1 capital shallowing contributed 1.7 percentage points or 68% of the 
fall in GDP per worker. The fall in average hours per worker contributed another 0.57 
percentage points (23%). Residual TFP fell by 0.20 percentage points so accounted for 
under a tenth of the total fall. Hence, the fall in labour productivity is mainly coming 
from the fall in capital intensity (due to shifts in factor prices) and to a fall in average 
hours worked.  
 
We use this method to produce a crude TFP index for the current recession and compare 
this to the 1970s and 1980s recessions in Figure 15.
7
 This is a much more plausible 
counterfactual than the “continues on trend” assumption in Figure 2. Figure 15 shows that 
in TFP terms the current recession is not so unusual compared to other severe post-war 
recessions. In 2010 the TFP performance was actually better than the previous recessions, 
but it then stalled so by the end of 2012 it was worse than the 1980s recession (but still 
better than the 1970s). Given that the global shock following the Lehman’s collapse was 
worse than both of these recessions, there is much less of a mystery to be explained in 
TFP terms. The fall of measured TFP in recessions is likely to be a more standard 
combination of labour hoarding and misallocation – there is no compelling evidence of a 
permanent structural change in underlying potential output growth according to these 
estimates.  
                                                 
6
 In principle it is always best to adjust for hours, but since hours are measured with more error than 
employment, Table 1 focused on the simpler measure.  
7
 It is crude because inter alia we are not making adjustments for heterogeneous types of capital or labour 
services in the current recession. For a much more sophisticated analysis which takes this into account see 
Goodridge et al (2013). 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have argued that the twin puzzles of the fall in labour productivity (GDP per worker) 
and the good performance of the labour market both have their source in the greater 
flexibility of the UK labour market compared to earlier recessions (probably because of 
labour market policy reforms over the last 30 years). The big difference of this recession 
is (i) its severity and (ii) that real wages have fallen dramatically. The fall in the price of 
labour coupled with the rise in the cost of capital has meant a fall in the capital to labour 
ratio which means that labour productivity falls substantially even though TFP has barely 
fallen at all. The fall in TFP is similar to other (less severe) post-war recessions from 
which the economy eventually recovered. The fall in measured TFP in recessions is likely 
to be due to factors such as under-utilisation of factors and uncertainty-driven 
misallocation. These are real costs but rather are more a feature of a typical cyclical 
downturn rather than permanent, structural changes. 
What this means is that the UK economy is not fundamentally the victim of a large 
supply side shock, but rather a very severe demand side shock. We should not be 
complacent – the longer the recession goes on, the greater risks of structural damage 
through hysteresis effects (e.g. DeLong and Summers, 2012). However, these demand 
problems are amenable to conventional solutions of fiscal and monetary stimulus as they 
imply a substantial output gap. In other words,  the argument of supply side pessimists 
that such stimulus programmes will simply lead to higher inflation do not, in our view, 
appear to be strongly supported by the data. 
There is a further consideration. Say there is substantial uncertainty about whether there 
has been a severe permanent TFP shock. If there was a fiscal expansion with little output 
gap this would be met with increases in inflation. The monetary authorities would be able 
to deal with this through raising interest rates, hopefully preventing a rise in inflationary 
expectations (unlike earlier recessions when interest rates were still under political 
control). On the other hand, if the argument of this paper is correct such a fiscal 
expansion would lead to higher output and more modest effects on inflation. In the 
17 
absence of such a fiscal experiment we will be condemned to slow growth for many years 
and potential hysteresis effects with severe effects on potential output. 
The message of this paper is not that structural policies are unnecessary. For example, 
strategies to improve the functioning of credit markets are vital. Long-run policies to 
improve investment in human capital, infrastructure and innovation are also very 
important as argued by Aghion et al (2013). But the upshot of our analysis is that there is 
room for a fiscal expansion, ideally through greater public investment in infrastructure, 
housing and schools.  
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FIGURE 1: GROWTH IN GDP PER HOUR GROWTH VS.  
COMPENSATION IN UK 1972-2010 (1972=1) 
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Source: Pessoa and Van Reenen (2012) 
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FIGURE 2: LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (OUTPUT/WORKER) 
10% gap 
Source: ONS Whole Economy GDP per worker 1979Q1-2012Q4
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/productivity/labour-productivity/q3-2012/stb-lprod-q312.html#tab-Whole-economy-
labour-productivity 
Note: Predicted value after 2008Q2 is dashed line assuming a historical average growth of 2% per annum.
FIGURE 3:CUMMULATIVE GDP SINCE START OF DOWNTURN 
Source: NIESR (May 2013) 
Current 
FIGURE 4: LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY ALWAYS POOR IN 
RECESSIONS, BUT POST 2008 LOOKS WORSE 
Source: ONS (2012), Output per worker http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_283259.pdf 
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FIGURE 5: UK PRODUCTIVITY (GDP/HOUR) SINCE 
2008 NOT SO BAD IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Source: ONS, Patterson (2012), http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_283259.pdf
Note: * US data is business sector. 
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FIGURE 6:  
UK RELATIVE GDP PER CAPITA 1870 – 2007; UK=100 
Source: Aghion et al LSE Growth Commission (2013), Crafts (2012) 
FIGURE 7: GDP PER WORKER (1979 – 2012, 1997=100) 
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FIGURE 8: NEGATIVE OUTPUT SHOCK & RIGID WAGES  – 
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FIGURE 10: INCREASING COST OF CAPITAL FOR LARGE 
FIRMS 
Source: Bank of England (2012) 
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FIGURE 11: THE COLLAPSE OF REAL INVESTMENT, 
2008-2012 (2008Q2=100) 
Source: ONS 
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FIGURE 12: LIQUIDATIONS MUCH LOWER THAN WE 
WOULD EXPECT 
Source: Bank of England (2012) 
FIGURE 13: MISALLOCATION ACROSS SECTORS 
Source: Bank of England (2012) 
FIGURE 14: DECOMPOSITION OF FALL IN GDP PER 
WORKER IN CAPITAL, HOURS & TFP 
Note: Fall in GDP per worker (2.5% 2008Q2-2012Q2) decomposed into component parts: capital, hours 
and TFP (% of fall in GDP per worker “accounted for” by each element in brackets).
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FIGURE 15: CHANGE OF TFP IN THREE RECESSIONS 
Note: TFP = “Total Factor Productivity”  (productivity after controlling for capital and hours); 1970s recession is  
1973-1978  (so 1 = 1973, 2 = 1974, etc); 1980s recession is 1979-1984; “Current” is 2008Q2-2012Q2. 1970s 
and 1980s TFP data from EU KLEMS. 2000s authors’ estimates from ONS data. 
1980s 
1970s 
Current 
(1) 
Change in GDP 
(2) 
Change in 
labour 
productivity 
(GDP per 
worker) 
(3) 
Change in effective 
Capital-labour 
ratio 
(4) 
Contribution of 
capital to change in 
labour productivity 
(5) 
% labour 
productivity 
change 
accounted for 
by capital-
labour changes 
1. Baseline ,
2008Q2-2012Q2 
-3.6 -2.5 -5.0 -1.7 68% 
2. Use changes  in
factor prices, 
2008Q2-2012Q2 
-3.6 -2.5 -6.1 -2.1 83% 
3. Baseline over
2008Q2-2012Q4 -2.1 - 1.7 -6.4  -2.2  125% 
4. Lower
depreciation rate 
2008Q2-2012Q4 -2.1 - 1.7 -3.4  -1.2 67% 
TABLE 1: EXAMPLE OF AGGREGATE 
GROWTH ACCOUNTING EXERCISE  
Note: Assumes labour costs are two-thirds of value added & Constant Returns to Scale ; Capital stock estimated 
From ONS 2008 whole economy net capital stock updated with real investment series as ONS has not published 
More recent capital stock estimates (depreciation=2.2% per quarter except in row 4 where it is 2%). 
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1: FIRM-LEVEL DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGEMENT 
SCORES WITHIN COUNTRIES 
Source: Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2013); Note: 1=worst practice, 5=best practice
